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Introduction 
To a real  extent the old approach towards nationalism had to die before the new 
interes t  could be born. In  the eyes of nationalist historians, nationalism was 
an organic process i n  which ethnic groups were awakened or  aroused to  become a 
nation. Nationalism was thus an expression of nationalist  feelings. The explanatory 
value of t h i s  largely tautological interpretation i s  obviously limited. (1) New 
approaches to the phenomenon of nationalism f i r s t l y  try to  locate it  within a broad 
sociological framework. For Tom Nairn it i s  a response to uneven capi ta l is t  
development (21, Anthony Smith connects it  with the r i s e  of the rationalized, 
bureaucratic modern s ta te  ( 3 ) ,  and John Brieully sees nationalism as a form of 
pol i t ics  which t r i e s  to  combine the incompatible concerns of modernity and 
tradition. (4) 
It i s  generally accepted that  the beginnings of Afrikaner nationalism 
must be sought i n  the l a s t  quarter of the nineteenth century. There is, however, 
no agreement on the context i n  which it developed or  the relationship between 
Afrikaner nationalism and Brit ish imperialism. For Robinson and Gallagher, the 
s t i r r ings  of ltproto-nationalism" i n  northern and southern Africa sparked off the 
spectacular imperial intervention. (5) Deryck Schreuder, anlaysing Brit ish policy 
towards southern Africa i n  the period 1881 to 1885, concludes that  Afrikaner 
nationalism was "perhaps no more than a mirage, a shadow, a spectre". Br i t i sh  
fears i n  th i s  respect were groundless: "the Afrikaner unity movement w a s  
temporary1'. (6) I n  a recent reappraisal of the scramble for  Southern Africa 
covering the period 1877 to  1895, Schreuder changed h i s  position. He writes that  
it was the strategies of the Imperial Factor i n  the in te r io r  which had provoked 
into vigorous l i f e  the new sense of Afrikaner group consciousness. "In particular, 
the federalist  policies of the 1870s, culminating i n  the Transvaal annexation and 
revolt,  appear to have pressed Afrikanerdom into a new common bond against Brit ish 
overrule i n  South Africa." (7) P. A. van Jaarsveldl S The Awakening of Afrikaner 
Nationalism, 1868-1881 takes a similar view. His thesis i s  that  the b i r th  of 
Afrikaner national consciousness was a reaction to the extension of Brit ish control 
over the Basutoland, the diamond f ie lds  and the Transvaal State. Without this 
intervention "the crystal l ization of [Afrikaner] national consciousness i s  
unthinkablet1. Without Bri t i sh  intervention "the Afrikaans-speaking section would 
i n  a l l  probability have been absorbed gradually into the Ehglish stream, and 
Afrikaans-Dutch would probably have disappeared, as had been the case with the 
Dutch language i n  America. But a f t e r  1881 Afrikaner nationalism became a factor i n  
South African politics". (8) 
A Model for  the Primary Phase of Afrikaner Nationalism, c.1869-1915 
This model for explaining the primary phase of Afrikaner nationalism (9) is  
comprised of the following parts: (a) the c h a n ~ i m  situation of the Dutch- 
Afrikaners i n  the colonial economy, (b) changes i n  the pol i t ica l  and 
administrative framework, (c) generational and class cliff erences i n  a colonial 
dialectic, and (d) the relationship of local nationalism to  the global 
context. 
(a) The chawina si tuation of the Dutch-Afrikaners i n  the colonial economy 
Recent analyses see the "new imperialismll as having started i n  the 1870s 
and 1880s and as being related to Britain 's  re la t ive  decline, which 
prompted a more aggressive search for  markets i n  A s i a  and Africa. (10) South 
Africa was turned into  a growth area fo r  Brit ish investment and trade as a result  
of the mineral revolution following the discovery of diamonds and gold. While the 
northern republics languished, the Cape economy expanded rapidly between 1854 and 
1874. The value of exports (including diamonds) increased eight times, that  of 
imports three times, and the revenue five times. Economic growth created new 
demands, particularly fo r  developing the diamond f ie lds ,  constructing railways and 
other public works, and waging w a r  against Africans. An analysis of the period 
1870 t o  1885 shows that  keeping up the flow of credit  was vital for  any Cape 
government which wished to  maintain i t s e l f  i n  power and for  the fortunes of 
landowners, commercial farmers, local businessmen and commercial middlemen and those 
active i n  the import-export sector. (11) 
While farmers struggled to adapt to the quickening of the economic pulse, 
the search for  land and labour became desperate i n  the quarter of the nineteenth 
century. By the 1870s the land frontier  had closed i n  South Africa. Previously, 
subsistence f d n g  could be practised on an extensive scale by enlarging the size 
of the grazing lands o r  trekking further into the in te r io r  instead of using an 
occupied area more intensively. Now, however, poorer farmers, particularly bywoners, 
faced an ever sharper squeeze from their  richer landlands and neighbours, and had 
to move on i n  search of whatever limited vrygrond (freeland) remained. (12) The 
Orange Free State (13) and Transvaal (14) no longer constituted an escape hatch fo r  
th i s  class. Labour w a s  the other crucial problem confronting the Dutch-Afrikaner 
f d n g  class. A l l  over South Africa, African labour steadily became concentrated 
i n  the hands of the richer farmers. 
Overlaying these demands fo r  more land and labour was the Dutch-Afrikaner 
insistence on a native policy that  would impose unquestioned white dominance over 
Africans. During the 1870s and 1F180s Brit ish imperial intervention was instrumental 
i n  helping to  t i p  the balance of power i n  South Africa i n  favour of the white 
colonial societies against the African chiefdoms. (15) Yet, for  Dutch-Afrikaners, 
particularly i n  the Cape and Transvaal, th i s  dominance w a s  not yet complete. A t  
the Cape the Afrikaner Bond and i t s  newspaper organ, De Zuid-Afrikaan, demanded that  
the Xhosa lands be thrown open for  colonization and development and that  independent 
peasantries be pushed out to  create a mass black labour force. Influenced by late-  
Victorian rac i s t  thought, the Zuid-Afrikaan i n  the 1880s produced a spate of 
editorials  i n  which it, for  the f i r s t  time, spoke i n  grandiose terms of the mission 
of the "Teutonic race" and of the need to achieve a complete victory fo r  the "great 
and noble race" over African society. (16) 
Opposed to these demands w a s  the Cape l ibe ra l  tradit ion which, as Stanley 
Trapido has shown, drew support not only from missionaries, editors and , 
administrators but also from a merchant class with an in teres t  i n  the survival of a 
free peasantry. (17) The Zuid-Afrikaan realized that  i n  some respects there were 
incompatible in teres ts  a t  stake. In an editorial  of 1885 it wrote: "Do the l 
farmers who want land and cheap native labour have the same interes t  as merchants l 
who see i n  the native consumers? Indeed not . . .l1 (18) Yet the Zuid-Afrikaan l 
advanced the argument that  ultimately there was indeed a larger common interes t  
between the Dutch-Afrikaner farming class and the English commercial and 
professional classes. 
The Colonial population have, despite that which 
disturbs the i r  unity, a common sense of purpose and 
common interes ts  which can triumph i n  the long run 
over division. Not only are there i n  the i r  hearts 
m a q  t i e s  which make them into one people (volk) but 
the great majority prefers Brit ish to  Dutch rule, 
and the great majority must realize that  they ought 
t o  toe one l i ne  i n  the struggle for  existence 
against the natives. (19) 
It w a s  t o  t h i s  I1people" U) that the term Africander or  Afrikander was 
applied by leading poli t icians of both Dutch and English descent. Changing 
economic conditions have thus led to an expression of volk identi ty i n  terms of 
common interes ts  and ideology rather than of common descent and historical  
memories. James Rose-Innes, a leading Cape l iberal ,  acknowledged this when he 
observed that  he would have considered himself an Africander had he not subscribed 
to  different views about the native question. (20) I n  the Transvaal, the 
apparently irreconcilable clash between burghers and outlanders led to  the concept 
Africander being defined naxcowly and i n  a way which differed sharply from the 
Cape definition. I n  a F i r s t  Volksraad debate of 26 June 1895, F. G. Wolmarans 
(ex-chairman of the F i r s t  Volksraad) expressed the view that  "those reared i n  N a t a l  
and the Cape Colony were to  be distrusted as much as men of other nations ... A man 
might be an Africander i n  name, and by b i r th  but not i n  heart and soul". (21) The 
Chairman of the Volksraad, Schalk Burger, declared that  "the word Africander 
should be interpreted as Transvaaler. Everyone from beyond the borders of the 
Republic must be viewed as a stranger, no matter i f  he came from the Free State, 
the Colony, Ehgland or  Holland, etc." (22) The Jameson Raid and the South African 
w a r  meant the eclipse of the Cape definition of Africanderhood. Subsequently, 
Afrikaner identi ty would increasingly be couched i n  terms of descent and cultural 
tradition. However, the goal of gaining effective control over African land and 
labour would remain the same. This formed a base upon which the pol i t ica l  platform 
of Afrikaner nationalism would be bu i l t  i n  the twentieth century. 
The closing of the frontier  together with the complete English dominance 
of trade, industry and government jobs meant that the economic opportunities for 
Dutch-Afrikaners were f a s t  shrinking by the end of the nineteenth century. Some 
found work i n  the mines, but on the farms a large and growing class of poor whites 
was developing. ltPoor whites" i s  perhaps a misnomer, f o r  very often these people 
were destitute, i l l i t e r a t e  and unable to find any work - an underclass that,  i n  
M m ' s  terms, was "passively rot t ing away". Ignorant and i l l i t e r a t e ,  they were 
equipped only for  farm work. But i f  they entered the service of a farmer fo r  wages 
as low as ten shil l ings a month they were despised by the blacks and considered 
pariahs by thei r  own peopIe; (23) 
The 'south African w a r  showed how f a r  the class cleavages had developed 
within Dutch-Afrikaner society. By the end of the w a r  more than a f i f t h  of the 
Afrikaners i n  the f i e ld  were f i&ting at the side of the British. Of the roughly 
5,000 "joiners" i n  this war, the vast majority had been bijwoners (tenant farmers). 
I n  an important sense the i r  treason was a rebellion against class exploitation. A 
recent study c i t es  evidence of seribus pre-wax bijwoner discontent. In  the 1880s 
and 1890s they often had to  go on commando against Africans without any recompense 
to defend the property of landholders, while thei r  own families were destitute. 
The Joiners of the Boer W a r  c learly hoped that  the Bri t i sh  would offer  them a better  
dispensation. (24) 
(b) The political context 
The political context of the 1850s and 1860s can be described as that of 
merely nominal representative government. In the Transvaal and Orange Free State 
the predominance of subsistence farming and weak tax base produced factionalism 
and largely powerless political centres. Attempts to create a spirit of nationality 
were largely the work of outsiders. In the Cape Colony the political centre was 
mch stronger but in Dutch-Afrikaner eyes there existed no real arena for power 
contests. Power was effectively in the hands of the British governor and 
Parliament was seen as a transient English institution where the conflicting claims 
of Cape Town and Grahamstown-Port Elizabeth were being thrashed out. In the rural 
areas the impact of government laws and institutions was hardly felt. Field- 
cornets still performed a large part of government fhnctions. Merchant capital 
was steadily extending its economic control and with it British cultural influence 
but it was not necessarily a revolutionary influence. It did not aim at 
transforming productive relations and tended to form alliances with or act as 
political spokesman for the dominant class in the rural areas. (25) It is in this 
context that one must understand the ambivalence of the Zuid-Afrikaan which at 
times resigned itself to the gradual assimilation of the Dutch nationality and 
language to English and at other times vigorously protested against British 
cultural pretensions and called for Dutch-Afrikaner grievances to be redressed. 
The expanding Cape economy and growing government revenue,particularly as 
a result of the development of the Diamond Fields, dissolved the Dutch-Afrikaner 
political apathy of the preceding decades. The politicization of latent ethnic 
ties was the result of the need to put a political movement together which could 
promote especially f d n g  interests, which were under-represented in Parliament. 
Why no Anglo-Dutch farmers1 party was formed has not yet been fully investigated. (26), 
but it seems important that the Dutch-Afrikaner farmers in the east were relatively 
poorer in having switched less successfully to wool farming and that they were not 
involved in the Eastern Province separatist movement of the 1860s which had cleft 
Cape politics. In societies where class and ethnic ties tend to coincide rather 
than cross-cut, it seems almost inevitable that political entrepreneurs who seek to 
establish or maintain a following rely on primordial ties to distinguish between 
~ ~ ~ ~ t l  and "them". (27) 
It is in this connection that the so-called discovery of Cape Dutch- 
Afrikaners' ties with the republics in the north mst, in the period 1869-1881, be 
seen. Citing several statements from Dutch papers, Van Jaarsveld argues that "the 
Cape Afrikaners found the road to themselves via the Republic". (28) Yet these 
statements expressing indignation about the annexation of Basutoland and the 
Diamond Fields were mostly made in the mid-1870s, long after the events. And the 
reason why these events were built as a grievance seems less related to any 
discovery of an ethnic identity than to the need to mobilize local political support 
for entry into Cape politics. 
The annexation of the Transvaal and the successful burgher rebellion of 
1880-81 were successfully utilized for local political mobilization, especially by 
the Afrikaner Bond. Hofheyr, who in 1881 was quick to forgive and extol the British, 
took control of the Afrikaner Bond in 1883, which gave him a firm political base. 
The proportion of the Dutch-Afrikaner representatives in Parliament increased from 
an average of 32 to 36 per cent for the period 1854 to 1884 to just under 50 per 
cent in the last sixteen years of the century. From the mid-1880s this bloc 
dominated Cape politics. Yet Hofheyr clearly subordinated ethnic or cultural 
demands to the material objectives of his supra-ethnic Afrikaanderdom and to Cape 
colonial interests. Despite the Bond's predominant position in the Cape Parliament 
and despite its commitment to promote the unity of all Afrikaners, it did not help 
to ease the financial plight of the republics by getting the Cape government to 
pay out their share of the custom duties or to enter into a customs agreement with 
them as proposed by both Kruger and Brand. (29) 
The advent of Responsible Government also put the amendment of the Cape 
constitution on the agenda. Andre du Toit recently traced the evolution i n  the 
pol i t ica l  thinking of the Dutch-Afrikaners since the 1850s when the i r  spokesmen 
accepted the low non-racial franchise. (30) In  the f i r s t  stage the popular 
franchise was supported as something essential fo r  the attainment of the goal of 
representative self-government to  replace colonial "despotism". Two arguments were 
advanced for  having equal and shared voting rights i n  a plural society. The f i r s t  
was that  it  may serve to  counteract what the Zuid-Afrikaan called "the f i c t i t ious  
inequality of wealth". A low franchise would favour the Dutch-Afrikaners and would 
prevent the wealthy from looking "with contempt on the poor, because he depends on 
him for  that  which wealth alone cannot providet7. (31) The second argument was that  
non-racial popular representative inst i tut ions would serve as a necessary safety valve, 
which w a s  considered more important than asserting social and ethnic prejudices. 
From the mid-18609, however, disillusionment with the low franchise and 
the constitution gained the upper hand. The Zuid-Afrikaan no longer believed that  
the constitution would counteract economic inequalities. Furthermore, non-white 
electoral support fo r  English "merchants and traders" gave r i s e  to  expressions of 
anti-democratic sentiments, strong racia l  prejudices and an insistence that  the 
constitution be changed. (32) Self-government from now on became an exclusive 
notion discussed i n  terms of Afrikaanderism. It basically related to  whites 
but the Cape Coloureds were not quite excluded, and the Zuid-Afrikaan at times 
found it necessary to  point out that  the demands of Afrikaanderism concerning the 
Dutch language would benefit the Dutch-speaking Coloureds too. (33) Afrikaanderism, 
as enunciated by Hofmeyr and h i s  organ, the Zuid Afrikaan, w a s  concerned with 
limiting African representation, which increased sharply i n  1884 when the Cape 
annexed the greater part  of the Transkei ter r i tor ies .  The big  constitutional 
question, according to the Zuid-Afrikaan i n  1889, was to weld the Dutch-Afrikaners 
and the Brit ish fellow-colonists in to  an Afrikaner nation and to incorporate the 
Africans into colonial society but to  exclude them from that  nation. (34) The 
constitutional amendments of 1887 and 1892-3 sharply reduced the African share of 
the to ta l  poll. It considerably curtailed the Bond's hos t i l i ty  to  the non-white 
franchise. With the help of the Cape l iberals  i t  succeeded, i n  1898, i n  at tracting 
a considerable number of African votes. By the turn of the century, Trapido 
concludes, non-white representation was becoming part of the pol i t ica l  culture of 
the Cape, accepted by both part ies as a necessary safety valve allowing for  the 
controlled release of pol i t ica l  energies. 
To an important extent the absence of part ies i n  the republics (neither 
the Progressives i n  the Transvaal nor the Afrikaner Bond i n  the Free State can be 
viewed as parties i n  the modern sense of the word) shaped the populist s ty le  of 
pol i t ics  i n  the two republics. Through memorials, opposition w a s  whipped up 
against the construction of railwa~rs, the i p  foreign merchants had on the 
economy, the w w t h  of English i n  schools cromoted by wealthy farmers), and 
the lack of government sympathy for  popular demands. Several well supported 
memorials also requested the unification of the two republics. However, there were 
no paxties which could turn these populist demands in to  a pol i t ica l  strategy. 
Memorials often involved Afrikaner nationality i n  support of local  demands, but the 
effect was to prop up local  nationalisms rather than a sustained pan-Afrikaner 
movement. 
(c) Changes i n  pol i t ica l  generations 
In  the period 1850 to  l9lO distinctions appeared among three different 
generations within the broad framework of ethnic poli t ics.  The f i r s t  generation, 
of which Hofmeyr, Brand and Burgers were the main representatives, can be seen as 
l iberal  modernizers trying to  reconcile traditional Dutch-Afrikaner society to  
Brit ish imperialism. The second generation, represented by S. J. du Toit, Ihwger 
and F. W. Reite, rebelled against the way i n  which the f i r s t  generation allowed 
traditional society to  be undermined. It sought to  conserve traditional society 
while pursuing modernization on thei r  own rather than Brit ish terms. The third 
generation of Hertzog and Smuts (before 1907) were secular nationalists who sought 
to  achieve a synthesis between conserving traditional society and responding to the 
demands of cap i ta l i s t  development i n  a modern state.  
I n  pushing the claims of the Dutch language, Hof'meyr did not work with 
the concept of any absolute r ights or  see Dutch as embodying the s p i r i t  of the 
people. Dutch was simply a tool by which a unilingual, culturally backward people 
could be induced to  improve the i r  l i teracy,  reading habits and general background. 
Ultimately the goal was to  put together a pol i t ica l  constituency i n  which the 
Dutch-Afrikaner population, i n  a vague sense, could claim par i ty  with English- 
speakers and be reconciled to  both the English-speaking colonists and the Brit ish 
empire. Once reconciliation and a "sane feeling of nationality" had been achieved 
it would matter l i t t l e  i f  Dutch as a language disappeared. 
In the l a t e  1870s Hofmeyr's approach was challenged by a new generation 
headed by S. J. du Toit and expressing i t s e l f  i n  Diepatriot. A new stratum of 
teachers and clergy, w h a t  Seton-Watson ca l l s  the language manipulators, whose 
livelihood depended on mastery of a language (36), sensed that  the f ight  fo r  Dutch 
was a losing struggle because it had become as much a foreign language as English 
for the great majority of Dutch-Afrikaners. To counter the headway English w a s  
making i n  schools and among IBC members, the spoken language of Afrikaans had to 
be elevated to a national language, a close connection had to be established 
between language and nationality, an& a distinctive Afrikaner outlook had to  be 
cultivated. Moreover, the secularist trend of the education ordinances of 1839 and 
1865 had to be reversed and the Churchos influence over the minds of the young had 
to  be restored b securing the principle of confessional religious instruction i n  
the schools. (377 Du Toit also wanted to  build a coalition on a base different from 
Hofmeyrqs. Hofmeyr cleazly had a coalition between the Afrikaner landholders and 
well-disposed English colonists i n  mind - he once said that  he would rather have 
f ive  English colonists join the Bond than a hundred Dutch-Af'rikaners. (38) Du. Toi-l;, on 
the other hand, had i n  mind the mobilization of all "nationally inclined1' 
Afrikaners, including lower class Afrikaners. The upper class scorned Du Toit 's 
strategy and his championing of Afrikaans. Du Toit's Patriot  was denounced i n  the 
Zuid-Afrikaan with the words: '!Brandy and the Patr io t  have this i n  common that  
they are enemies of civilisation." In  the Orange Free State a correspondent of the 
Friend reported that, as news, the Patriot  was "not only read by the lowly 
bijwoners amongst us but by civil ized people as well". (39) Clearly seeing 
Du Toit as a threat, Hofmeyr successfully manoeuvred to  get control of the . 
Afrikaner Bond. 
I n  the Free State, Brand was succeeded by Reits, seen by some as the I 
f i r s t  Afrikaans poet. I n  reaction to the growth of English influence under Brand, I 
Reitz vigorously promoted the Dutch culture and republican independence. In  the 
Transvaal, the rebellion of Kruger against the Burgers government did not so much 
represent the advent of a new generation as a throwback to tradit ional  frontier  
sooiety. The t radi t ional is ts  rejected the modernization of the s ta te  under Burgers 
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and especidly  his introduction of seculax education. Whatever s ta te  education 
there w a s  - and they did not want much - had to be based on religion and taught 
only through the medium of Dutch. The t radi t ional is ts  were also uncompromising i n  
the i r  demand for  a Transvaal-Afrikaner s ta te ,  res is t ing citizenship not only fo r  I 
English outlanders but Cape Dutch-Afrikaners as well. 
(d) Local nationalism and the international context l 
For both treasury and military reasons Great Britain i n  the second half l 
of the nineteenth century created an empire of association i n  South Africa run  by 
local c l ients  and collaborators. (40) Winning the Cape Dutch-Afrikaners over t o  l 
the role  of sub-imperial agents was the touchstone of this policy. It has often 
been sugg-ested, both by contemporary poli t icians and by historians, that  the l 
Jameson Rdd, together with growing Transvaal economic independence, irrevocably 
destroyed this strategy. Quoting Chamberlain, Robinson and Gallagher concluded 1 that  Afrikaner nationalists  a l l  over South Africa were coming together again, as 
they had i n  the f i r s t  Transvaal w a r  of 1881, i n  defence of republicanism. The I 
nationalist reaction had s e t  the pol i t ics  of South Africa against imperial federation 
1 
and i n  favour of a republican future. Only direct  intervention could now prevent 
South Africa from dr i f t ing out of the empire and weld it into  a Bri t i sh  
dominion. (41) 
Leaving aside the issue whether Britain entered the w a r  to  restore 
traditional Brit ish supremacy or  to construct a modern policy i n  South Africa (42), 
the question i s  whether Afrikaner nationalism stood poised fo r  victory a f t e r  the 
Jameson Raid. Certainly the Raid severely dented the image of Britain and i ts  l 
local agents, but it  i s  remarkable how l i t t l e  Hofmeyr, apart from breaking with 
Rhodes, changed h i s  collaborationist course. In  the pol i t ica l  c r i s i s  preceding I 
the w a r  Hofmeyr and Schreiner put all the pressure on the Transvaal to  make 
concessions. (43) I 
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Even the two Afrikaner republics did not rush in to  each other's m s  
af te r  the Jameson Raid. Between 1889, when a pol i t ica l  and trade treaty between 
the Free State and the Transvaal was signed,and 1895, relations between them 
deteriorated. Disweements led  Reitz of the Free State to  the conviction that  
Kruger w a s  deliberately trying to  f rus t ra te  the ideal of republican unity. After 
the Raid, President Steyn of the Free State, i n  a l e t t e r  of 13 June 1896, proposed 
that  negotiations be opened about the unification of the two republics. A s  the 
Free State was t ied  to the Transvaal by a defensive treaty, Steyn w a s  keen to  
acquire a moderating influence over the T r a n s d .  To Steyn9s disenchantment 
the Transvaal waited more than eight months to respond to his overtures. A recent 
analysis suggests that  i t  w a s  only a f te r  Chamberlain, i n  January 1897, attacked 
Krugerls handling of the Outlander grievances that  Kruger decided to pursue closer 
unity with the Free State. (44) Merriman, i n  October 1899, was convinced that  i t  
was only the unyielding demands of Milner i n  the preceding year that converted the 
Free Staters, "our best and firmest friends ... into stern and determined 
foes". (45) 
Undoubtedly the existence of an increasingly independent Transvaal s ta te  
would, as Milner feared, promote the growth of Afrikaner nationalism throughout 
South Africa. (46) Yet so strong were the conflict of in teres ts  between the s ta tes  
and colonies, the pull of local nationalisms and the divisive effect  of imperialism 
and capitalism that  it  was only Milner's determination to  crush Afrikanerdom that  
produced a measure of pan-Afrikaner unity that  never existed before. Britain's 
grand i l lusion was not so much restoring imperial supremacy (47); i t  w a s  
anticipating a full-blown Afrikaner nationalism i n  the Raid's aftermath. 
Conclusion 
Among the colonists of Dutch, German and French descent ethnic sentiments, as 
dist inct  from those of class or  caste, were slow to  develop despite a high degree 
of endogamy and shared culture. Even the name Afrikaner went through several 
permutations i n  the eighteenth and the nineteenth century. T h i s  fumbling to find 
and define an ethnic name gives some indication of how d i f f i cu l t  it  was to put a 
nationalist movement together. Certainly pol i t ica l  impulses, such as  the Transvaal 
rebellion of 1880-81, produced protests, which suggests that  feelings of nationality 
were present. Taking a larger view, one can conclude that pol i t ica l  and 
economic structures described i n  the previous section provided the potential for  
nationalist mobilization. Yet to a rea l  extent the development of nationalism had 
to await both w a r  and the fu l le r  development of capitalism as a social as well as 
an economic system. Merchant capitalism could not break the parochial mould of 
subsistence farming. Education, a small-scale operation, was largely the concern 
of the rich, who even i n  the republics demanded that  pr ior i ty  be given to  
instruction i n  English. Only by the 1890s did Dutch-Afrikaner leaders become aware 
of the f u l l  impact of capi ta l is t  development on thei r  people. The poor-white issue 
leaped into prominence i n  the Transvaal, the Free State and the Cape. I n  the 
Transvaal s ta te ,  absentee owners held more than half of the land and they were 
4 
making inroads i n  the Free State, particularly i n  the northern and eastern parts. 
It i s  significant that  it  w a s  Steyn, one of the f i r s t  nationalist  leaders i n  the 
modern sense of the word, who issued a d n g  to the Free Statera that  the i r  
sons would i n  due course become tenants on the i r  fathers' land. I n  1898 Steyn 
remarked that  the struggle of South Africa was not between Dutch and English but 
between individualism and capitalism, which w a s  robbing the workers of the i r  
l iv ing and identity. (48) 
The w a r  produced a much greater sense of ethnic community than ever 
before existed. But as important was the advent a f t e r  the wax of a modern, 
capi ta l is t  s t a t e  i n  South Africa. (49) Of particular significance was the 
introduction of compulsory education fo r  whites. I n  the race fo r  power i n  the new 
s ta te  no pol i t ica l  leader could afford to remain indifferent about the s ta te  of 
education and the language of instruction. For controlling the schools and 
building a pol i t ica l  constituency a separate language would be an excellent device. 
But that  language had to  be vigorous. The hour of the predikanten, the teachers, 
the poets and the historians had come. 
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